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Information Technology (IT) can support or even cause changes in the structure of industries and the
relationships between firms. Yet, at present, we lack the vocabulary and theory to explain or predict
these changes. Drawing on recent work in the resource-based theory of the firm, we propose that
shifts in resource values are central to economic restructuring. We show how IT can operate to shift
resource values through the basic economic drivers of network externalities and economies of scale,
scope, and specialization. We use this theory to investigate the situations that will lead to each of the
basic structural responses: changes in market consolidation, in diversification, and in vertical
integration. We also can make some specific statements about what forms can be employed in the
structural responses: ownership, outsourcing, or cooperation.
1. INTRODUCTION 2. ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING: ANTECEDENTS
It has been observed that IT can cause or support changes The issues of economic oiganization and stmcture have
in the structure of industries and the relationships between been concerns of several areas of study. As a result, there
players. It has even been suggested that these structural has been some variety in definitions, assumptions and
changes may be more important to competitive position theory. In this section, we examine the evolution of
and survival than being the innovator, since strategic theories of economic structure in economics and strategic
applications of IT are often easily duplicated (Clemons and management. We seek to give a sense for the relationships
Row 1987; Vitale 1986). between these major areas of academic study and for the
evolution of concepts and theories, as a context for the
resource-based view presented in the next section. We
Although IT's role in economic change is recognized, we draw on the concepts of each theory as appropriate. We
lack even good vocabulary to discuss such changes in do not review the literature's empirical support of these
economic structure, much less any theory for explaining or theories.
predicting them. The problem is complicated by the fact
that structural changes in a particular market don't happen
in a vacuum, but interact with changes in other markets. 2.1 Traditional Industrial Organization View
Many structural changes involve the inter-relationships of
a single firm's operations in several markets. Economic structure has a central role in traditional
industrial organization (IO) economics (c.g., Scherer 1980).
This paper examines economic reorganization and the role This role is probably best characterized by the stmcmre-
IT plays in it. Economic change is viewed in terms of conduct-pe,fonnance paradigm. In this model, market
changes in the allocation and integration of strategic structure provides the context for firm behavior, and both
resources. This resource-based approach builds on our together determine performance: Market structure
earlier work (Clemons and Row 1987). In that paper, we generally includes (Scherer 1980, p. 4):
suggested that change in competitive position comes from
leveraging an advantage or mitigating a disadvantage in . The number and distribution ofbuyers and sellers
critical resources and showed how IT could be used to • Product differentiation
accomplish this by exploiting structural differences among • Barriers to entry
firms. • Vertical integration
• Diversification
Here we show how IT's effect on resource values can
operate to change the structure of economic activity. The The theory in this field grows out of traditional micro-
proposed framework is used to make predictions about economics. It is posited that firm profits arise from
what types of structural changes would be expected in monopoly power, when there is a monopoly seller or a few
specific situations. sellers that can collude to restrict output below the
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competitive level. Where there is an oligopoly, monopoly However, the traditional IO field has contributed a
power is viewed as a shared industry resource. Market vocabulary, extensive theory, and a substantial body of
structure thus plays the critical role of constraining the size empirical results that can help in understanding the impact
of this shared resource or the range of potential profits of IT on economic structure. This field has been drawn on
available to competitors through collusion. extensively in the IT literature. IO, as popularized by
Porter (1980), has been used frequently (e.g., McFarlan
There are several problems with this approach for our 1984; Parsons 1983). Bat(os and Treacy (1986) also view
purposes. In traditional IO, the unit of analysis is a market more formal IO analysis, for example game theory, as a
or industry, variously defined in terms of substitution of promising direction for future work. Unfortunately, the
demand, production, or inputs. But in investigating the traditional IO approach has not yet yielded a conceptual
impact of IT on economic structure, we are often con- theory of strategic applications of IT with significant
cerned with changes in industry boundaries and relation- explanatory or predictive capability, largely, we feel,
ships between markets.2 For example, Merrill Lynch's because of the limitations of traditional IO discussed
CMA financial product combined banking functions, check, previously in this section.
and debit card access to funds with brokerage functions,
investment reporting, and margin accounts (including
sweeps of available funds into money market funds). This 2.2 The New Institutional Economics View
product supported a breakdown in the boundary between
the banking industry and the securities industry (Clemons Several conceptual directions have been taken to cope with
and Row 1988a). 10 gives us few tools and concepts to the problems presented by traditional IO. These include
deal with these structural relationships between markets. Williamson's (1975) transaction cost theoty, the evolu-
tionary theoty of Nelson and Winter (1982) and what we
Traditional IO also is weak in dealing with firm differ- call the resource-based theog: These theoretical direc-
ences. The microeconomic basis of 10 represents firms as tions that form the basis for our work.
production functions and often assumes homogeneous
firms. In most industries, firms differ in very fundamental Williamson's transaction cost theory attempted to address
ways. A key difference among firms is often in what some shortcomings in traditional IO. He posited that the
markets they compete and what activities they perform in organization of economic activity was based on balancing
those markets. Another critical difference is the organiza- production economies, such as scale, against the cost of
tional structure of firms. We are concerned with how IT transacting. With the transaction as the unit of analysis,
affects relationships between business units in a firm and Williamson united the problems of market structure and
how these relationships influence competition in each organizational structure, by viewing markets and firms as
market (Clemons and Row 1987). We view these relation- alternative ways of organizing economic activity. Firms
ships as an important part of economic structure. were viewed as more efficient than markets in situations of
recurring transactions under high uncertainty with signifi-
There are some attempts to incorporate observed firm cant sunk costs in managing the transaction.
differences in both strategy and profitability into traditional
IO through a theory of strategic groups (e.g., Caves 1977; The transaction cost approach appears to be very useful in
Porter 1979) or groups of firms following similar strategies. investigating the relationship between IT and economic
This work on the structure within an industry retains the structure. First, its definition of structure is sufficiently
idea of monopoly power as a shared resource, but makes broad to deal with relationships between markets and
the relevant unit of analysis a strategic group. In this between business units in a firm (organizational structure).
theory, barriers to entry may vary by strategic group, Second, it provides a link between micro level behavior and
creating differences in the profitability of the groups. the high level features of economic structure. Decision
Further, each group's profitability is influenced by mobi- makers characterized by bounded rationality and oppor-
lity bam'ers, which protect the group from rivalry with tunism operate over time in an uncertain environment. 
other groups. However, this approach still lacks the These micro-level assumptions lead to the breakdown of
conceptual tools to discuss the structure of relationships markets in certain technological and environmental
between strategic groups and between business units in a situations, determining the boundaries and structure of
firm. firms and markets. Moreover, the micro level theory
appears well suited to information systems, given the
A final problem with the traditional IO view of economic importance of bounded rationality, information, and
structure is that its theoretical roots are based in assump- uncertainty.
lions that are unhelpful in analyzing the structural impact
of IT: In particular, equilibrium of optimizing behavior But transaction cost theory does not have a well defined
under perfect information seems more than a little theory of profitabilitys or of differences among firms, and
restrictive. Understanding the role of IT depends on therefore of changes in economic structure. Differences
explicit attention to bounded rationality and imperfect in firm profitability are assumed to arise from differences
information. in efficiency in setting firm boundaries, organizational
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structure, and employment relationships. This does not addresses many of the conceptual problems in alternative
give a clear view of what guides reaction when the under- theories, particularly industrial organization economics and
lying economics change, particularly when firms differ in transaction cost economics, which we identified in the
strategy and structure. Moreover, transaction cost theory previous section. More importantly, we view this approach
does not provide the tools for analyzing interrelationships as being extremely useful in analyzing IT's impact on
among a firm's transactions. For example, a fixed trans- economic structure.
action infrastructure that is common to several types of
transactions can drastically change the transaction costs for Penrose (1959) first proposed that firms be viewed as
any individual interaction. Similarly, converting data to collections of resources. Her interest was primarily in
machine readable form at one point in a value chain explaining the growth of firms, which was, in her view,
decreases the transaction costs in subsequent transactions. driven by a desire to utilize slack resources. Rubin (1973)
further clarified and formalized the concept of a resource
The issue of structural change was addressed extensively as a "fixed input which enables a firm to perform a
by Nelson and Winter (1982). In their evolutionary theory, particular task" (p. 937). He modeled firm expansion as
they proposed that firms be viewed as a collection of being driven by jinn-specifc resources, those resources
routines. Reaction to a change in environment will depend that were difficult to transfer via the market mechanism.
heavily on the nature of a firm's learned routines (i.e.,
history). Their conceptual approach is intuitively appealing The role of resources in firm growth and diversification has
for the study of IT. Again, information and information been further developed by Teece (1980, 1982) and Rumelt
processing limitations play a central role. IT, in fact, can (1982). Wernerfelt (1984) related the resource perspective
be viewed as a medium for storage of an organization's to several issues in IO. He showed that focusing on
routines. While we do not adopt their modeling approach, resource ham'eis, the resources that underlie the entry
their philosophy of the change process underlies the barriers of traditional IO, was very useful in planning
resource-based work presented later. diversification strategies. The importance of strategic
factor markets was developed in detail by Barney (1986),
The relevance of transaction cost theory to the issues of IT who showed that the timing of resource acquisition on the
has been recognized within the IT field (Bakos and Treacy strategic factor markets greatly influences the cost of
1986). Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) presented the implementing various strategies for different firms. This
most complete treatment to date of the transaction cost work is very useful in understanding the emergence and
view of the relationship between IT and economic organi- evolution of firm differences.
zation. They suggest that IT influences economic organi-
zation by reducing transaction costs and reducing the Abernathy and Clark (1985) as well as Teece (1986,1987)
specificity of assets. As a result, IT would tend to favor have shown how innovation can influence the value of a
market-mediated transactions. They identified two forms firm's resources and how these resources can influence
of electronic mediation: electronic markets and electronic who retains the economic benefits of the innovation. The
hierarchies. However, relying solely on transaction cost impacts of an innovation will generally differ according to
theory, it was not possible to make any statements about the resource positions of the various participants.
the competitive effects of such changes.
In the rest of this section, we explicate the relationship
Clemons and Kimbrough (1986) focus more on the between resources and economic structure and describe
competitive effect of reducing transaction costs. They how resources influence the evolution of structure over
argued that "competitive advantage" could result when the time. We then introduce the role of IT in this process.
transaction costs in dealing with some competitors were
reduced more than for others. The situations and types of
applications that would lead to this result were not fully 3.1 Resources and Structure
developed.
In the resource-based approach, the concern is with the
The resource-based theory, presented in the next section, allocation of resources to activities. Firms are viewed as
appears, at least conceptually, to resolve the problems of resource bundles under common managerial control. A
transaction cost theory, while explicitly taking into account firm's profitability is closely linked to the terms under
the evolution of economic structure. Moreover, this which it can access these resources in the strategic factor
approach has the capability of making predictive statements markets. Firms and markets evolve to maximize profits,
and discriminating among possible outcomes. given the distribution of resources, which will usually differ
due to history and chance (Barney 1986).
3. IT AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING:
A RESOURCE-BASED VIEW Within this context, economic st,ucture can be viewed as
the distribution of resources to activities and the interac-
In this section we describe the resource-based view of tions among these activities. As with the transaction cost
economic organization. We maintain that this approach approach, we are concerned with the question of how the
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interactions are managed. The form of organization for Firms with an initial comparative advantage in the resource
the interaction is subject to the tradeoff between produc- will realize the increased value as superior profitability
tion economies and transaction costs. (i.e., return on investment). Firms that must acquire the
resource must do so at a price that reflects the economic
There are two sets of interactions that are of importance. change; the increase in economic value is capitalized. That
The first are what we call vemca/ interactions: the flow means that the costs and benefits of the same strategic
of goods and services along a single value chain. In adjustment may be radically different for different players
vertical interactions, the output of one activity is an input in the same industry.
to the other activity. There are also horizontal interac-
tions: the coordination of similar or complementary Differences in profitability lead to changes in industry
resources among multiple markets or industries. Both of structure as firms try to exploit a resource advantage or
these types of interactions can be either intra-organi- minimize the effects of a resource disadvantage. There is
zational or inter-organizational. rarely only one solution.
Changes in economic structure thus amount to changes in
the allocation of resources to activities or changes in the 33 Role of IT in Restructuring
interactions between activities. The mechanism of this
change process is discussed next. IT enters this picture in two ways. First, innovations in IT
or innovative applications of IT can be a source of changes
in resource values. This can be the case where the
3.2. Evolution of Economic Structure application is itself a key strategic resource or where IT
directly influences the economics of production or transac-
The evolutionary view of industry restructuring that we tion activities. For example, in drug distribution IT has
propose treats resources as fundamental drivers of the become a significant resource in itself as well as enabling
structural change process. Industry restructuring is the economies from the rationalization of purchasing and
result of changes in the value of these resources. distribution (Clemons and Row 1988b).
The restructuring process begins with some shift. This may Second, IT can be used as a mechanism for implementing
be external to the firm or be driven by innovation within strategies for adjusting to changing values of other, non-
the firm. The shift may be radical or may result from IT resources. For example, Merrill Lynch's CMA account
gradual evolution of the firm's environment, including was primarily an effort to take advantage of economic and
changes to product supply and demand conditions, technol- regulatory changes that enabled Merrill to offer banking-
ogy, and institutional support. like services, while still being protected from retaliation by
banks; this discontinuity increased the value of Merrill's
The shift alters the economic value of some resource. For distribution network, money market funds, and other
example, an innovation that doubles the yield of a machine resources by opening up a new source of demand (Cle-
changes the productive value of that machine. But a mons and Row 1988a).
change in the productive value of a resource doesn't
necessarily translate into a change in economic value, Similarly, the use of systems for quality improvement in the
which also depends on the supply and demand conditions automobile industry was driven by an increase in the value
for that resource on the strategic factor market. of quality, itself driven by the quality of Japanese imports,
and a sharp increase in the cost of consumer credit (e.g.,
If the resource is available in competitive supply, all Eisenstein 1988).
producers will be able to acquire the resource at the same
cost, using the increased productivity to expand output,
driving down the product price, with the result that much
of the economic benefit of the increased productive value 4. TYPES OF RESTRUCTURING
of the resource will be competed away to customers.
Economic restructuring can be viewed as changes in the
But many strategic resources are not available in competi- allocation and integration of resources. We can therefore
tive supply, due to imperfections in the strategic factor begin to classify changes in economic structure by looking
markets. Some resources are unique, or essentially at the basic ways firms can alter or redeploy their resource
nonduplicable, such as market shares in a mature industry. bundles.
Some resources are so highly specialized that the transac-
tion costs of acquiring them are prohibitive: • Size: Firms can expand or contract within a particular
Thus, changes in the economic value of key resources will market, relative to the total market size.
not affect all firms equally, but will depend on the initial
distribution of the resources. Firms often differ in re- • Diversification: Firms can expand into, or withdraw
source endowments for historical reasons (Barney 1986). from, different markets and industries.
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• Vertical Integration: Firms can expand into, or exiting. Similarly, if a firm gets wider, for example, by
withdraw from, activities that are vertically related offering a service to several industries, then either existing
within a single value chain. companies offering that service are getting smaller, or
existing companies that consume that service and had
Each of these can be generalized in terms of changes in performed it internally are now getting narrower.
integration between resources. An increase in firm size
implies an increase in the integration of resources horizon- In the following sections we will discuss the major types of
tally within the market, i.e; more resources are under the restructuring and the primary economic drivers of these
common control of a single firm:' An increase in diversifi- types in the context of IT.
cation means an increase in the integration of resources
horizontally between markets. An increase in vertical
integration implies, of course, increased integration of 4.1 Horizontal Integration of Resources
resources vertically along a single value chain. Corre- within a Market
sponding statements can be made for decreasing integra-
tion. It is important to keep in mind that we are dealing Changes in the horizontal integration of resources within
with relative terms, rather than absolute measures of a market is perhaps the most straightforward of the basic
structure. forms of restructuring. The primary economic driver of
concentration within a market is the desire for scale
By viewing the underlying concept as integration, rather economies. Scale economies increase when the produc-
than simply firm boundaries, we can recognize that restruc- tivity of a fixed factor of production is increased. In
turing may be virtlial, in that many of the economic effects general, IT contributes to increasing scale economies both
of restructuring can be realized without changes in owner- as a resource itself and as a mechanism for coordinating
ship. For example, McKesson's Economist can be viewed other resources. IT is, therefore, a pressure for increasing
as virtual forward integration: the strategic network of concentration in most markets.
McKesson and its customers achieve many of the benefits
of the large chains, but without ownership (Clemons and As a strategic resource, IT exhibits large inherent scale
Row 1988b). economies in both development and operation. This may
seem obvious, but it is of critical importance. Software,
In fact, the fonn of integration can be by ownership, like information, is a public good, in that use does not
outsourcing, or cooperation. The first two are the tradi- reduce the value of the resource. The marginal software
tional hierarchies and markets of transaction cost eco- development cost of installing a branch automation system
nomics fame (Williamson 1975). Cooperation is meant to in an additional branch is close to zero. Similarly, the
include what Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) call marginal cost of processing an additional transaction in a
"electronic hierarchy" and what has been called "strategic data center also approaches zero.
network" (Thorelli 1986). These forms are slightly dif-
ferent for horizontal, as opposed to vertical, interactions. Due to these scale economies, there should be pressure for
increased concentration of the IT resource. The amount
The form of resource integration (ownership, outsourcing, of pressure should be related to the importance of IT to
or cooperation) depends in part on the initial resource the business and its cost relative to other costs. There are
positions. Small players that are severely disadvantaged in three furms this concentration could take: ownership
certain key resources may be acquired or forced into consolidation, outsourcing, and cooperative supply. The
bankruptcy; alternatively, they may be forced into virtual modes chosen depend on the potential economies of
consolidation in the form of consortia or reliance upon integration, the initial resource positions, and transaction
vendors. For example, the members of the NYCE ATM costs in transferring the services of the resource. All of
network formed a joint venture to generate the scale and these modes can exist at once in any given industry.
geographic coverage necessary to compete with Citibank.
Likewise small brokerages and banks find it advantageous We would expect that resource integration through
to purchase back office processing from larger banks and ownership consolidation would increase with the impor-
other third parties, since internal development and opera- tance of the IT applications to the core business, with the
tion would be prohibitively expensive, given their lack of potential of IT economies of scale, and with the initial
scale. Clearly, multiple modes of integration can co-exist resource position (e.g., market share or other measure of
within an industry. relative scale). In other words, the larger the company
(relative to competitors) and the more critical the IT
It is important to realize that any change in a firm's resource, the more we would expect to see an aggressive
structure is usually accompanied by related changes in ownership consolidation strategy. The observed ownership
other firms. Economic restructuring must be viewed in consolidation occurring in IT intensive industries, such as
this holistic way. For example, if a firm increases in size banking, securities and other financial services, is consistent
relative to the market (i.e., increases its market share), with this statement. This was particularly acute in securi-
some other firms are contracting relative to the market, or ties firms following the 1975 deregulation of commission
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rates. Small competitors, without the resources to develop Department. Amadeus and Galileo, in Europe, and
and operate the applications efficiently, are under pressure Abacus and Fantasia, in Asia, are all joint ventures
to either be acquired or merge (Clemons and Row 1988b). between multiple airlines. Similarly, in most major
markets, ATMs have consolidated into one or two cooper-
Where the transaction costs of accessing the resources are ative multiple-owner networks. A seeming exception to
low relative to the savings from scale economies in the this is the MAC network in Philadelphia, a monopoly
resource, and the risks of dependence are low also, other network that is wholly owned by Philadelphia National
options are available. Smaller competitors may outsoutre, Bank. The single owner form of MAC can largely be
that is, acquire the services of the resources from third explained by timing. MAC was an early shared ATM
parties. These third party vendors may be larger players network, initiated years before NYCE, and before many of
from within the industry or from industries with significant its participants realized the strategic importance of ATM
overlap in the key resources (see the discussion on diversi- service to their retail operations. They were therefore
fication below). Again, the financial services industry is a willing to accept the risks associated with outsourcing from
good example. Many large players, such as Merrill Lynch a competitor (Clemons 1989). Also, closer examination
and PNC Financial, provide IT support to smaller players reveals that there is now a governing board made up of
in their industry. MAC's member banks. Additionally, the network re-
sources are still owned and operated by the member banks,
Smaller competitors may also form consonia or other constituting a viable threat of defection and thus con-
cooperative ventures to compensate for a resource disad- straining MAC's ability to exploit its monopoly position.
vantage. Cooperative ventures are most frequently
observed when there are substantial benefits to resource So far we have focused on IT as a resource subject to scale
concentration, but no player has the resources required economies, but IT can also exploit scale economies in
by themselves, and when there are factors that argue other strategic resources. Potential scale economies may
against outsourcing. This occurs when there are substan- exist in some key resources, but not be exploited due to
tial risks that the vendor will be in a position to exploit transaction costs in transferring the services of the re-
the firm's dependence at some point in the future (see, for sources. IT may reduce these transaction costs, enabling
example, Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978). Cooperative potential scale economies to become realized. For
ventures are most common as a defense against dominant example, Hewlett Packard, the electronics giant, utilizes a
players. New York's NYCE ATM network is an example. very decentralized structure. Operating units are very
NYCE was formed largely as a response to the dominant focused and autonomous. However, there is a significant
position Citibank had in ATMs. overlap in components and other inputs among these
diverse businesses. HP has implemented a purchasing
Another very strong pressure for concentration of IT system that allows central purchasing of these common
resources can come from netwo/* grternalities. Network components, while not compromising the autonomy and
externalities exist when the value of a system is dependent flexibility of the operating units. The system also tracks
on the number of participants in the system. Systems that component quality across divisions to aid in supplier
handle interactions between customers and suppliers may negotiations and integrates component demand schedules
exhibit such economies, since the value of the system to the to improve coordination with supplier's production sche-
customer may depend on the range of products or sup- dules. This system exploits economies of scale, scope and
pliers participating. The key example here is the airline specialization in purchasing as well as more fully utilizing
reservations systems. The network externalities are so HIP's tremendous purchasing power.11
significant that all systems feel they must list all major
airlines, even competitors. Bank ATM networks also
exhibit significant network externalities, since the value of Frequently the potential scale advantages that can be
the network to users increases with the number of banks exploited through IT stem from load leveling of fixed
participating. resources and increased predictability afforded by scale.
Otis Elevator Company operated its elevator maintenance
activities decentralized by geographical region. By using
Where network externalities and scale economies are IT to centralize customer service via their Otistine system,
significant, it is unlikely that the industry will support many Otis Elevator was able to greatly improve the productivity
competing systems. At the same time, such a monopoly or and utilization of customer service personnel. Moreover,
oligopoly situation is extremely threatening to most players the system enabled better planning and allocation of
in the industry. In these situations cooperative ventures maintenance resources and information usefulin marketing
appear to be a stable solution. Airline reservations systems and product planning. The result was lower costs and
and ATMs are again excellent examples. One of the two greatly enhanced customer service (Stoddard 1987).
dominant airline reservations systems in the US (Covia, Similarly, McKesson used the data captured by their
formerly United Apollo) is now co-owned by multiple Economist system to rationalize warehouse and delivery
airlines. Attempts by the second system to open ownership operations with dramatic results (Clemons and Row
up to other airlines were recently derailed by the Justice 1988b).
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Again, these economies will create pressure for resource multiple markets, reducing average units costs. However,
consolidation. In these cases, alternatives to ownership diversification can also create scope economies where the
consolidation are more difficult. This is primarily due to value of the integration is greater than the parts indepen-
higher transaction costs in transferring the services of non- dently.
IT resources. However, examples do exist. Abbot Labora-
torics and 3M have formed an alliance for joint ordering The resource being leveraged between markets may be IT
and distribution of their products (Muller 1988). This itself. In this case, the benefits may come from scale
cooperative venture shares not only the systems, but economies in the IT. McKesson has leveraged its drug
physical distribution resources. distribution systems and expertise in other industries, such
as office supplies distribution. Here, scale economies in IT
Will IT ever lead to fragmentation of a market? We argue development are obtained through technology transfer
that it would be rare for IT to lead to fragmentation, between markets or industries. It is also possible to realize
although IT may allow a fragmented market to remain so. scale economies in IT operations by integrating IT
From time to time the argument is made that a new resources between markets. McKesson is attempting this
technology will lead to a populist "fragmentation" -- see, for with its efforts to create super-distribution centers, com-
example, early literature on CATV and cellular radio. bining operations for multiple distribution businesses
Often, other reasons and other factors, such as economies (Clemons and Row 1988b).
of scale in marketing, lead to the opposite result.
This integration between markets can take on any of the
Note that by outsourcing or forming cooperative ventures, forms that integration within a market can: ownership
two related structural changes are occurring. First, the consolidation, outsourcing, or cooperative agreements.
resource is becoming more concentrated in the market. Again, IT can reduce the transaction costs sufficiently to
Second, the firms outsourcing have shortened their value allow potential economies of scale in other, non-IT
chains, i.e., reduced the activities in the value chain which resources to be realized. The discussion in the previous
they perform. In other words, a scale-intensive resource section is also relevant here.
can consolidate without affecting the fragmentation of
other activities. An example is ATMs in the banking The cooperative agreements in the airline industry, such as
industry. ATM services have consolidated in most mar- the recent agreements between SAS and Texas Air (Ott
kets,12 but the networks have not exploited this con- 1988) or British Air and United (Banks 1988), are good
centration to earn extraordinary profits. Access to these examples of cooperative arrangements between markets.
services is affordable even to most small banks. As a While these airlines do not compete directly, 14 they can
result, ATMs do not create significant pressure for bank share airport facilities and marketing efforts, reducing
consolidation.13 costs. Moreover, shared facilities and shared flight codes
allow each airline to funnel customers to the other in a
This phenomenon of outsourcing may be more common reciprocal fashion: SAS is a feeder for Continental and
where the resource is IT, due to the low transaction costs vice versa. This type of arrangement is becoming in-
involved in IT services. When data are already in machine creasingly popular in the industry. IT plays a critical role
readable form, it is easy to outsource. In fact, we have in implementing this integration.
seen examples where firms may outsource discontinuous
portions of a single value chain. Maybe the best docu- Provident National Bank in Philadelphia performs back
mented example of this is in guaranteeing student loans, office processing for small brokerage firms. Similarly,
where some steps are performed by the originator, and State Street Bank in Boston has a major position in
some performed by the guarantor; the outsourced steps are securities custodial services. Such outsourcing between
not, in general, contiguous steps in the loan servicing markets appears very common in financial services due to
process (Kimbrough 1989). When the resources being the high overlap in the resources required in the different
integrated are tangible, such as warehouses and trucks, it markets. Even firms outside the industry, such as ADP
may be more difficult to outsource. We will return to the and McGraw-Hill, perform services for small players in
issue of such "outsourcing" when we talk of vertical financial services. We expect outsourcing and cooperation
disintegration. between markets actually to be more common than within
market, since there is less likely to be anti-trust limitations
4.2 Horizontal Integration or Resources or competitive concerns.
between Markets
In the above discussion, similar resources are being
The horizontal integration of resources is not limited to a integrated between markets and industries. These econo-
single market. Where similar resources are employed in mies are scale economies made possible by the firm's
several markets or industries, it may be possible to utilize scope. IT can support such economies either by increasing
IT to integrate these resources, realizing considerable the scale benefits of the resource or by decreasing the
economic benefits. These economic benefits may be transaction cost of coordinating resource utilization
creating scale advantages in resources that are similar in between markets.
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In some cases, integrating dissimilar resources between disintegration is likely to be a stable cooperative con-
markets can provide an alternative form of economies of tractual relationship (electronic hierarchy), rather than a
scope, where the integration results in a product or service competitive one (electronic market). We can think of no
whose value is greater than the combined value of the examples of IT leading to fully competitive disintegration
constituent parts separately. Merrill Lynch's CMA is a for access to resources. There is a reasonable argument
classic example of this, where banking and brokerage supporting this result. Contractual sourcing will be
services were integrated in a single delivery system (Cle- preferred over competitive sourcing when the economies
mons and Row 1988a). The airline CRS also appears to of an assured relationship outweigh the improved price
have a "super-additive" value function with the addition of (less search costs) that could be obtained from competitive
hotel and rental car reservations. The value of this search. Where the product in question is access to a fixed
combination is more than just combining reservations fur resource, it appears rare that competitive sourcing will be
these different functions: it is a platform for integrated preferred. imagine a bank bidding for an ATM network
trip management services. Exploiting this source of scope daily,15 or deciding who will perform back office processing
economies was central to the ill-fated Allegis strategy, on a transaction by transaction basis. For resource access,
leading to Ferris's ouster and the spinning off of Allegis's the sophistication of the interface, the need for record
non-airline businesses. Although Wall Street frowned upon keeping, the expense of training, and the value of a
this strategy, other firms have not. In particular, SAS is relationship over time argue for long term contractual
pursuing services that integrate the handling of baggage, relationships, even for commodity resources.
reservations, ground transportation and boarding cards. It
recently acquired a 40 percent interest in the Intercon- IT can also lead to vertical integration of resources. What
tinental Hotel chain. SAS is also consistently the top is required for this to happen is a decrease in production
ranked airline in terms of customer satisfaction. economies of scale relative to transaction costs. An
excellent example of this is desktop publishing and other
The effect of IT on the form and mode of resource graphics services that are increasingly being brought in-
integration between markets is more difficult to generalize house.
and predict than that within a market. The great variety
of possible resources makes between-market forms of
structural change much more context-specific than those 5. CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL
within a market. This is particularly true of increase in IMPLICATIONS
value from integrating dissimilar resources.
Changes in industry structure are usually very complex. It
43 Vertical Integration of Resources is difficult to classify these changes at a level high enough
to allow reasonable generalizations, yet detailed enough to
Vertical resource integration refers to the transfer of goods permit explanatory or predictive analyses. We think the
and services along a single value chain. Vertical integra- discussion above fits these criteria.
tion is driven by the balancing of production economies
and transaction costs, as in the horizontal case. But in the The basic message is that, in many cases, resource posi-
vertical situation, decreased transaction costs or increased tions may be more relevant to long-term survival and
production economies leads more to resource dis- profitability than being leading edge in IT. Where a firm
i,itegration. is at a resource disadvantage with respect to information
systems, it should look very carefully at development
Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987) first pointed out that projects to see whether outsourcing or cooperative devel-
if IT reduced transaction costs then IT should lead to more opment and operation may be more appropriate. This will
market-mediated transactions, i.e., reduced vertical usually be the case where
integration. They also pointed out that where there is
some benefit to close vertical coordination, there is likely • the system is, or is likely to become, a commodity
to be an electronically implemented sole supplier relation- service (i.e., a strategic necessity);
ship, which they call an "electronic hierarchy." Our work
here is consistent with their views. • the system is subject to considerable scale econo-
mies in development or operation;
As we discussed above, IT can lead to vertical dis-
integration (outsourcing) in access to strategic resources • there is a low transaction cost in acquiring the
when a firm is at a scale disadvantage in operating those service.
resources (compared to larger competitors or other
vendors) and it is prohibitive to acquire the resources
necessary to be competitive. In particular, when a vendor exists that is not a direct
competitor, now or potentially in the future, and the
Where IT is the resource, or where IT is the mechanism application is not critical to a core business, outsourcing is
for delivering the services of the resource, the mode of the more likely than cooperative agreements.
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When a firm is at a disadvantage in terms of tangible International Conference on Infonnation Systems, San
resources, systems may still play a crucial role in address- Diego, California, December 1986, pp. 99-108.
ing this disadvantage. Systems can be used to mitigate a
resource disadvantage by coordinating resources with other Clemons, E. K., and Row, M. C. "Cash Management
business units within the firm or with other companies with Accounts: An Analysis of Strategic Information Systems,"
needed resources. For example, the cooperative agreement Proceedings of the 21st Hawaii International Conference
between SAS and Texas Air provides each with needed on Systems Sciences, IEEE Press, January 1988a, pp. 131-
feeder routes. 140.
A key implication of this discussion is that it may become Clemons, E. K., and Row, M. C. "McKesson Drug
increasingly difficult to ignore inter-relationships between Company: A Case Study of Economist." Proceedings Of
markets and between business units within firms. As the 2131 Hawaii International Conference on Systems
competitors continue to exploit potential economies in Sciences, IEEE Press, 1988b, pp. 141-149.
resource integration, particularly between industries, a
much more holistic approach towards planning and strategy Clemons, E. K., and Row, M. C. "Structural Differences
may be required. Among Firms: A Potential Source of Competitive Advan-
tage in the Application of Information Technology."
The approach does not tell what specific resources can be Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference 011
integrated to provide the economies discussed. The variety h*nnation Systenis, December 1987, pp. 1-9.
of resources and products in the economy is much too vast
for that level of detail. However, we think that this Eisenstein, P. "MIS in Transition, Part III: Detroit's
approach does provide guidance in the search for opportu- Counterattack Strategy." Computer Decisions, Volume
nities as well as in evaluating potential ideas. 20, Number 5, May 1988, pp. 52-56.
Clearly we have not rigorously established the external Grossman, S. J., and Hart, 0. D. "The Costs and Benefits
validity of our approach. Instead, we have used examples of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integra-
to demonstrate the plausibility of the theory. More tion." Journal ofPolitical Economy, Volume 94, Number
rigorous empirical investigation is required. 4,1986, pp. 601-719.
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11. This example is based on unpublished studies con- 13. Of course, there are other pressures for consolidation.
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